1650-1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modern
Era
Volume 3

Article 16

1997

A Kantian Sublime in Shelley "Respect for our Own Vocation" in an
Indifferent Universe
Christoph Bode

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/sixteenfifty
Part of the Aesthetics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bode, Christoph (1997) "A Kantian Sublime in Shelley "Respect for our Own Vocation" in an Indifferent
Universe," 1650-1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modern Era: Vol. 3, Article 16.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/sixteenfifty/vol3/iss1/16

A KANTIAN SUBLIME
IN SHELLEY
Respect for our Own Vocation
in an Indifferent Universe
Christoph Bode

sublime, it seems, is en vogue. Following Jeanl^^Franfois Lyotard's original, if not to say slanted reading
of Kant, many have welcomed the term as a kind of
catch-all for all sorts of phenomena or experiences that defy, or
seem to defy, verbal expression, thereby mistaking a collateral
aspect of the eighteenth-century sublime, which is, at best, only
a necessary feature, for a sufficient, defining one. This watering
down of a hitherto powerful philosophical and aesthetic concept
to a stale cliche has predictably led to an inflation in the use of
the term—now, almost every time words fail, the sublime is
invoked—a process that was considerably helped by the
additional willful yoking together of Kant's das Erhabene (the
sublime) and Freud's die Sublimierung (sublimation), an
association that admittedly may seem less far-fetched in
languages other than the original German.
But as in other areas, the price of inflation is a decline in
purchasing power. Gradually emptied of the discriminating
power of a philosophical concept, the sublime stands in danger
329
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of becoming all but meaningless—a useless tool. The following
essay, in contrast, uses the term rigorously, that is, as a clearly
definable, if historically differentiated concept that can help us,
by this very differentiation, to understand crucial modifications
in the aesthetic-philosophical and poetical discourses of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Shelley's "Mont Blanc" is indisputably one of the key poems of
his overall oeuvre. No matter what line of interpretation they
prefer, all critics are agreed that it holds a strategic position for
the characterization of Shelley's poetological, ideological and
philosophical profile in his middle years, and as the exact nature
of this middle phase is itself highly controversial, "Mont Blanc"
can be seen as a text whose interpretation vitally affects the
assessment of Shelley's entire career.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that "Mont Blanc," "the
most difficult of Shelley's shorter poems," "has received more
diverse interpretations than any other.'" The stakes are high.
There is, it is true, a certain consensus that "Mont Blanc," just
like Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey," is a highly complex
philosophical poem, which takes a specific topography only as a
starting point for an extended discussion of the relationships
between mind and world, consciousness and matter, subject and
object—a philosophical deliberation poetically dramatized. But
it is far from being settled what the actual outcome of Shelley's
exertions is. For a while, the Platonists held "Mont Blanc,"
declaring it proved Shelley to be a genuine idealist. These
forces of yesteryear have long withdrawn into distant valleys,
and their rearguard fighting hardly impinges upon the current
critical debate any more. Others have read "Mont Blanc" in a
materialist vein, arguing that it shows a godless universe
' Kenneth Neill Cameron, Shelley:
University Press, 1974), 244.

The Golden Years (Cambridge:

Harvard

Kantian Sublime in Shelley

331

governed by Necessity. Others again have held that Shelley
evidently couldn't quite make up his mind and that the poem
is therefore full of tension and downright contradictions.
Today, the ruling orthodoxy undoubtedly is that Shelley was
a skeptic, though that designation seems to have become an
ultra-liberal umbrella term, sheltering all sorts of philosophical
positions, from the idealist skepticism of Berkeley to the
empiricist skepticism of Hume, from the special brand of
William Drummond to the contention that Shelley was so
skeptical that he had hardly any convictions of his own, but
spent his life—a deconstructionist avant la /ettre—exploding
those of others.^
It may seem presumptuous to claim that after all this
something new—and possibly something new and of impor
tance—can be said about "Mont Blanc." But I should neverthe
less like to suggest a new reading, one that re-defines the
philosophical core of the poem by differentiating between its
implied ontology, on the one hand, and its epistemology, on the
other and then proceeds to show how the two are poetically
linked.
^ There is, in addition to Frank Jordan, ed.. The English Romantic Poets: A Review
of Research and Criticism, 4th ed. (New York: MLA, 1985), a short survey of the
varieties of interpretation in Earl Wasserman, The Subtler Language; Critical
Readings of Neo-Classk and Romantic Poems (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1959; rpt. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), 195-240. The classical,
though meanwhile dated study of Shelley's supposed Platonism is James A.
Notopoulos, The Platonism of Shelley: A Study of Platonism and the Poetic Mind
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1949). Cameron (nl) is more materiahstically
inclined, as seems Richard Holmes, Shelley: The Pursuit (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1974). I. J. Kapstein, "The Meaning of Mont Blanc" (1949; rpt. in
Patrick Swinden, ed., Shelley: Shorter Poems and Lyrics—A Casebook [London:
Macmillan, 1976], 165-77), emphasizes the tensions of the poem. Whereas C. E.
Pulos, The Deep Truth: A Study of Shelley's Scepticism (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1954, rpt. 1962), is still the best introduction to Shelley's
skepticism, Terence Hoagwood, Skepticism and Ideology: Shelley's Political Prose and
Its Philosophical Context from Bacon to Marx (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press,
1988), attempts a more radical reading.
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"Mont Blanc" was written in late July 1816, when Shelley,
Mary Godwin, and Claire Clairmont visited the valley of
Chamonix. It was the same trip on which Shelley described
himself as "Democrat, Philanthropist, and Atheist," "destination
I'enfer" in possibly three hotel registers or visitors' books. As
we know from his diary letters to Peacock, Shelley was
overwhelmed by the alpine scenery and especially by the sight
of the Mont Blanc massif. His poem takes its origin from this
overpowering experience and is at the same time an attempt to
create in language the equivalent of its occasion, as Shelley
himself explained in his preface to the first edition of "Mont
Blanc" in 1817:
It was composed under the immediate impression of the
deep and powerful feelings excited by the objects which
it attempts to describe; and, as an indisciplined overflow
ing of the soul, rests its claim to approbation on an
attempt to imitate the untameable wildness and inaccessi
ble solemnity from which those feelings sprang.^
The verbal echoes of Wordsworth's "Preface to Lyrical Ballads"
are quite distinct, but so are the differences: whereas
Wordsworth defines poetry as "the spontaneous overflow of
powerful feelings" and adds significantly, "it takes its origin
from emotion recollected in tranquillity,'"* it seems that Shelley
intended a direct, as it were, iconic presentation of those
"powerful feelings," without the mitigating filter of a "recollec
tion in tranquillity." And this might explain why "Mont Blanc"
begins with such enormous power and thrust, with a
' Percy Bysshe Shelley, "Preface" to History of a Six Weeks' Tour, The Complete
Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, eds. Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck (New York:
Gordian Press, 1965), 6:87-8.
•* William Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800/1850), The Prose Works of
William Wordsworth, ed. W. J. B. Owen and Jane Wortington Smyser (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974), 1:118-59, here 148-9.
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momentum that carries its periods over the line endings like a
mountain stream in schuss:
The everlasting universe of things
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves,
Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloomNow lending splendour, where from secret springs
The source of human thought its tribute brings
Of waters,—with a sound but half its own.
Such as a feeble brook will oft assume
In the wild woods, among the mountains lone.
Where waterfalls around it leap forever.
Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river
over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves. (1-11)'
As William Keach has brilliantly analyzed "Mont Blanc"'s
highly complex rhyme scheme and metrics,' I can confine
myself to remarking that in this first stanza—which is surpris
ingly abstract after the topographical title—Shelley makes a
clear, unequivocal philosophical statement on the relation of
mind and the world of objects: The human mind is flown
through by the never-ceasing stream of the world of objects and
delivers but a moderate contribution of its own, a contribution
whose share is often overestimated, as Shelley makes clear by a
simple analogy in lines 7ff.: "the universe of things" and
"human thoughts" stand in the same relation to each other as
"vast river" and "feeble brook" do. This has the clarity of a
mathematical equation:
universe of things
human thought

vast river
feeble brook

' All Shelley texts, unless otherwise stated, are quoted from Shelley's Poetry and
Prose, eds. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers (New York: Norton, 1977).
® See Wilham Keach, Shelley's Style (New York: Methuen, 1984).
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Although this is as clear as it can be, Earl R. Wasserman says
that "Mont Blanc" begins with "a set of strikingly paradoxical
statements,"^ and Seymour Reiter paraphrases in incomprehensi
ble reversal, "the physical universe brings its tribute of waters
to the source of human thought, which is in the mind,'" and in
spite of the clear subordination sketched in these initial lines
Angela Leighton can see "no hierachical discrimination between
the status of the mind and that of the everlasting universe of
things."'
As if he had foreseen this and as if he wanted to forestall all
misunderstanding, Shelley once more underlines his view of
things by adding another extended analogy in the second stanza:
"thus thou" signals unmistakably that he regards the deep ravine
of the river Arve as yet another concrete illustration of the
relationship defined in stanza 1. The ravine—all passive—is run
through by a river that is the symbol of an active power
("Power in likeness of the Arve comes down" [16]). The ravine
is an entirely passive receptacle, or rather duct, even what it
gives back is only the echo of a perpetual dynamics that has its
source elsewhere:
Thy caverns echoing to the Arve's commotion,
A loud, lone sound no other sound can tame;
Thou art pervaded with that ceaseless motion.
Thou art the path of that unresting sound
Dizzy Ravine! (30-4)
For those who still cannot see how the roles are distributed,
where Shelley puts activity and where passivity, the following
' Wasserman, The Subtler Language, 198. It should be noted, however, that
Wasserman does not uphold this remarkable contention in his later study Shelley;
A Critical Reading (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
* Seymour Reiter, A Study of Shelley's Poetry (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1967), 29.
' Angela Leighton, Shelley and the Sublime: An Interpretation of the Major Poems
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 63.
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lines should be an eye-opener because he describes the
relationship of subject and object as a continuously dialectical
one, but one in which the object pole is clearly dominant:
and when I gaze on thee
I seem as in a trance sublime and strange
To muse on my own separate phantasy,
My own, my human mind, which passively
Now renders and receives fast influencings.
Holding an unremitting interchange
With the clear universe of things around. (34-40)
If one compares this to the opposite passage in Wordsworth's
"Tintern Abbey," which also renders the relation between mind
and world as a dialectical one, the difference is immediately
evident: "I am still," we read in Wordsworth's poem,
A lover of the meadows and the woods.
And mountains; and of all that we behold
From this green earth; of all the mighty world
Of eye, and ear,—both what they half create.
And what perceive. (103-7)^°
In Wordsworth, consciousness projects the world and is actively
involved in the constitution of reality, whereas here in "Mont
Blanc" the "unremitting interchange" has an obvious tilt
towards the object pole. The backflow that consciousness
returns is only seemingly active, even its supposed giving is,
strictly speaking, anything but—note: "which passively / Now
renders and receives." Consciousness is embedded in a total
continuity, which can hardly be called dialectical any more
because it does not allow autonomy. Consciousness is absorbed
in this continuity, in which subject and object are fused on the
The Norton Anthology of English Literature, Fifth Edition, eds. M. H. Abrams et
al. (New York: Norton, 1986), 2:154.
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terms of the latter. This conception will be maintained till the
end of "Mont Blanc." Even the following passage—indeed one
of the most difficult and controversial ones of the poem—
which is full of ambiguous grammatical references and equivocal
metaphors and deals with the question how, under these
circumstances, something like creativity can take place at all,
does not significantly modify Shelley's model.
Instead, he now turns in stanzas 3 and 4 to the origin of that
enormous power—the unmoved mover or primum mobile
behind the perpetual cycle of existence and decay (see lines
84-95)—in his imagery: Mont Blanc. But majestic as its
summit rises ("Still, snowy, and serene"), the scenery below is
one of utter devastation and destruction. Superhuman forces
have here formed a landscape that is harsh, hostile, and
repulsive:
Its subject mountains their unearthly forms
Pile around it, ice and rock; broad vales between
Of frozen floods, unfathomable deeps.
Blue as the overhanging heaven, that spread
And wind among the accumulated steeps;
A desalt peopled by the storms alone.
Save when the eagle brings some hunter's bone.
And the wolf tracts her there—how hideously
Its shapes are heaped around! rude, bare, and high.
Ghastly, and scarred, and riven.—Is this the scene
Where the old Earthquake-daemon taught her young
Ruin? Were these their toys? or did a sea
Of fire, envelope once this silent snow? (62-74)
This is the likeness of a nature that in its very greatness and
material power is absolutely indifferent to humanity, heedless
of its existence. Nature—and therein lies its terror—stands for
the inconceivable, the Other, the non-human that breaks into
man's life:
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The glaciers creep
Like snakes that watch their prey, from their
far fountains,
Slow rolling on; there, many a precipice.
Frost and the Sun in scorn of mortal power
Have piled: dome, pyramid, and pinnacle,
A city of death, distinct with many a tower
And wall impregnable of beaming ice.
Yet not a city, but a flood of ruin
Is there, that from the boundaries of the sky
Rolls its perpetual stream; vast pines are
strewing
Its destined path, or in the mangled soil
Branchless and shattered stand: the rocks,
drawn down
From yon remotest waste, have overthrown
The limits of the dead and living world.
Never to be reclaimed. The dwelling-place
Of insects, beasts, and birds, becomes its spoil;
Their food and their retreat for ever gone.
So much of life and joy is lost. The race
Of man, flies far in dread; his work and dwelling
Vanish, like smoke before the tempest's stream,
And their place is not known. (100-120)
Shelley presents a view of nature, of creation, in which man
holds no privileged status but is brutally and helplessly exposed
to the rage of its elements. Overawed, he recognizes its
superior strength, thrown as he is into a world that was not
built for him but to which he has to accommodate. That the
majestic river can work beneficently in distant countries (124)
only supports the idea that this power is to be conceived of as
essentially indifferent-, that is, it does not exist with regard to
humanity, it is not concerned with it. This is the lesson of the
sublime and awful scene:
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Power dwells apart in its tranquillity
Remote, serene, and inaccessible:
And this, the naked countenance of earth.
On which I gaze, even these primeval mountains
Teach the adverting mind. (96-100)
This universe cannot be conceived of as being anthropocentric,
and the only consolation it holds is an indirect one: compared
to the dimensions and time periods of geology and the cosmos,
the injustices and cruelties of political tyranny and despotism
vanish like nothing. A recurrent topos in Shelley's political
thinking—well known from Queen Mab, "Ozymandias" and
Prometheus Unbound, to say nothing of his prose writings—is
thus introduced at the end of stanza 3: The very proportions
of nature expose social orders and formations as but passing,
inessential deviations. Paradoxically, it is through its nonhuman dimensions that material nature opens up the revolu
tionary perspective that we are still in the pre-history of man
kind—history proper has not yet begun:
The wilderness has a mysterious tongue
Which teaches awful doubt, or faith so mild.
So solemn, so serene, that man may be
But for such faith with nature reconciled;
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal
Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good
Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel. (76-83)"
" For the problematics of "But for such faith" see Cameron, 249-50; John Rees,
"'But for such faith': A Shelley Crux," Review of English Studies 14 (1964): 185-6;
Timothy Webb, Shelley: A Voice Not Understood (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1977), 137; John Kinnaird, "'But for such faith': A Controver
sial Phrase in Shelley's 'Mont Blanc,'" Notes and Queries 213 (1968): 332-4; Gerald
McNiece, "The Poet as Ironist in 'Mont Blanc' and 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty',"
Studies in Romanticism 14 (1975): 311-36, 320; Judith Chernaik, The Lyrics of
Shelley (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1972), 59; plus Harold
Bloom's minority view in Shelley's Mythmaking (New Haven: Yale University
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When I said above that Shelley's conception or model of the
relation between mind and the world of things would be
maintained till the end of the poem, that was, I confess, a
deliberately ambiguous phrasing. For although the determina
tion of human thought by outside forces is emphasized yet
again in lines 139-41:
The secret strength of things
Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome
Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee!
there is, in the last three lines of "Mont Blanc," a totally
unexpected, incredible and brilliant reversal:
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea.
If to the human mind's imaginings
Silence and solitude were vacancy.' (142-4)
That is the decisive point: The human mind alone invests the
world with meaning and significance. Mind may be a part of
nature, subject to its laws—but nature is only meaningful, it is
Nature writ large, because there is a consciousness for which
even silence and solitude are not vacancy, not emptiness and
nothing. Human consciousness does not create the flow of the
"everlasting universe of things"—quite the contrary, it is based
upon it—but it structures it and invests it with meaning and
significance. It is in the human mind that the world becomes
conscious of itself. And if one were looking for an example of
this essentially human ability to "see things as" to find meaning
even in dead matter and understand StUle as Schweigm—well,
Shelley's "Mont Blanc" is a wonderful specimen: it illustrates
its own thesis, it practices what it preaches.
It remains to discuss whether Shelley understood this great
continuum, in which subject and object are fused, in which the
Press, 1959), 32fF.
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former is conditioned by the latter, but the latter named and
interpreted by the former, in an idealist sense as a spiritual one
or in a more empirical sense as a material one—or whether he
transcended this alternative in "Mont Blanc." And it is, I should
like to suggest, specifically the notion of the sublime that helps
to elucidate Shelley's highly original position in this question,
because it is, as I will attempt to show, in the concept and in
the experience of the sublime that Shelley finds a paradigmatic
and genuinely aesthetic solution for a philosophical antinomy
that had haunted him for quite a while.

The concept of the sublime which derives from the rhetorical
treatise Peri Hypsous of Pseudo-Longinus of the first century
after Christ, is—it is trivial to observe—of an immense
importance to eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century
discussions of art and literature in Britain. The first translation
of Peri Hypsous into English dates back to 1652 0ohn Hall), but
it was only the translation of Boileau's somewhat idiosyncratic
rendering of the tract (1674, trans. 1711-13, 1736, 1752) and the
new translation by William Smith in 1739 that spread its
influence decisively.'^
Now the interesting thing about the eighteenth-century
sublime in Britain is that the originally rhetorical term—it
designates a textual quality that points to the greatness of the
soul of its author—is first stretched in the opposite direction;
it comes, after Boileau, to mean the treatment of a theme and
its effect on the reader, the feeling it evokes, and then, finally,
For an understanding of the history of the concept I deem the old studies still
indispensable: Samuel H, Monk, The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in
Eighteenth-Century England (New York: MLA 1935); Walter John Hippie, Jr., The
Beautiful, the Sublime and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic
Theory (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1957); Marjorie Hope
Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics
of the Infinite (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959).
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applied to a set of feelings that are aroused by nothing literary
at all, viz., by the grandeur and majesty of nature as it is
manifested in the sea, the sky, or high mountains. This shift in
meaning—for which the names of Thomas Burnet, John Dennis,
Joseph Addison (all of whom did know the thing but did not
use the term for it), and of Edmund Burke may stand—is,
curiously enough, a British and German phenome- non," the
French retain the rhetorical meaning, so that Laurence Sterne
could write in his Sentimental Journey in 1768:
I confess I do hate all cold conceptions, as I do the puny
ideas which engender them; and am generally so struck
with the great works of nature, that for my own part, if
I could help it, I never would make a comparison less
than a mountain at least. All that can be said against the
French sublime in this instance of it, is this—that the
grandeur is more in the word-, and less in the thing.. 14
This shift toward the natural sublime and the concomitant
emphasis on the subject's reaction to nature's objects culminates
toward the end of the century in Immanuel Kant's analysis of
the sublime in his third critique. The Critique of Judgment
(1790)—of which more later. Shelley's "Mont Blanc" gives us
in an almost classical manner an image of the natural sublime
as both quality of an object and subjective experience at the
same time. The alpine landscape, the feeling of being overpow
ered and a strange feeling of fusion or unity with the surroundFor this see Monk, Hippie and Nicolson, as well as, of course, the entries in the
OED. Compare also Frederick Staver, "'Sublime' as Applied to Nature," Modem
Language Notes 70 (1955): 484-7; Christian Begemann, "Erhabene Natur: Zur
Ubertragung des Begriffs des Erhabenen auf Gegenstande der auBeren Natur in den
deutschen Kunsttheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fur
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 58 (1984): 74-110. For a different though
not very convincing opinion, see Theodore Wood, The Word "Sublime" and Its
Contexts: 1650-1760 (The Hague: Mouton, 1972).
Laurence Sterne, A Sentimental Journey & Journal to Eliza (New York: Signet,
1964), 58.
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ings, these are all commonplaces of the eighteenth-century
British discourse on the sublime. And yet, the specific way in
which Shelley handles and combines these elements in "Mont
Blanc" is, for all I know, entirely unique in British Romanti
cism. A closer scrutiny of the second element—the feeling of
being overpowered—can help to answer the question of
Shelley's ontology, a philosophically informed reading of the
third—the feeling of union or fusion—will clarify Shelley's
epistemology, and these two points having been established, the
full originality of Shelley's solution to his philosophical crux
will, it is hoped, become apparent.
First, how far does Shelley's depiction of the overpowering
experience of Mont Blanc and its glaciers give us a clue as to
whether he saw "the great continuum" as a material or a
spiritual one? It is a topos of the discourse of the sublime in the
eighteenth century to regard the overpowering experience of
nature's immensity as a proof of the existence of God and the
fundamentally spiritual nature of reality. Samuel Taylor
Coleridge's "Hymn before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni,"
published in the Morning Post and Poetical Register in 1802 and
reprinted in The Friend in 1809, is a textbook example of this:
The natural landscape proves God, he is the author behind the
work. "Who would be," thus Coleridge on the message of his
poem, "who would be, who could be an Atheist in this valley of
wonders!"^® He obviously could not foresee the possibility of a
R B. Shelley. For especially when seen in contrast with
"Hymn before Sunrise," it is evident how demonstratively
"Mont Blanc" is written against a firmly established literary,
philosophical, and religious tradition, how determinedly it
denies—confronting the same scenery!—any transcendental
transfiguration of the horror. Whereas Coleridge's "Hymn"
—partly plagiarized from Friederike Bruns "Chamounix beym
Sonnenaufgange" (1791), not even written in the vale of
" Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Poetical Works, ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 377.
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Chamonix and disparagingly qualified by William Wordsworth
as "a specimen of the mock sublime"'^—whereas this hymn
praises God, "Mont Blanc" is a document of the overpowering
experience of a material force threatening bodily annihilation.
Just as the human mind is confronted with something that
surpasses its capacities ("the very spirit fails"), so man as a
physical being is threatened to be annihilated by "Nature as
Might" (Kant), and he realizes his utter impotence in view of
these material forces when he sees that "to offer some resistance
to [them]...would be quite futile."'^ This second aspect of the
sublime—called the dynamically sublime by Kant in contrast to
the mathematically sublime—seems to me to be foregrounded
to such a degree in stanzas 3 and 4 of "Mont Blanc" that the
impression it gives is one of unalloyed materiality. Here,
Shelley's sublime is, as in an admittedly ambiguous passage in
Keats, "a material sublime."^^ In its evocation of terror in view
of an indifferent, godless universe, to which man as a physical
being is only peripheral and accidental, "Mont Blanc"—espe
cially when seen against the backdrop of the tradition it breaks
with—is a manifestation of an ontological and matter-of-fact
materialism.
But things look different in regard to epistemology, and it is,
as I indicated, the concept and the experience of the sublime
that allows Shelley to bridge the apparent philosophical hiatus.
The third commonplace of the sublime mentioned above is the
peculiar experience of unity, the fusion of subject and object.
For the Romantics especially, the sublime is a relational
phenomenon, that is, it is neither to be located exclusively as a
quality inherent in the object nor exclusively as a psychological
See Stuart Curian, Poetic Form and British Romanticism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), 60.
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1992), 110. Page references preceded by Qf are to this edition.
" The poem is "To J. H. Reynolds, Esq." For a discussion see Louise Smith, "The
Material Sublime: Keats and Isabella," in Keats; The Narrative Poems—A Casebook,
ed. John Spencer Hill (London: Macmillan, 1983), 105-18.
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effect in the beholder. William Wordsworth makes this veryexplicit in his fragment "The Sublime and the Beautiful"
(1810/11), a text that was probably intended to form part of
what was to become A Guide Through the District of the Lakes
(1835) because it treats, again, of the experience of the sublime
in a mountainous region. Wordsworth says
[that] [t]o talk of an object as being sublime or beautiful
in itself, without reference to some subject by whom that
sublimity or beauty is perceived, is absurd...The true
province of the philosopher is not to grope about in the
external world and, when he has perceived or detected in
an object such or such a quality or power, to set himself
to the task of persuading the world that such is a sublime
or beautiful object, but to look into his own mind and
determine the law by which he is affected.^'
But this affection of the mind results from "the notion or image
of intense unity, with which the Soul is occupied or
possessed."® Again, it was Kant who explained, much better
than Wordsworth could, how a feeling of failure (the failure to
grasp that which is "great beyond all comparison") is finally
transformed in the two-phase experience of the mathematically
sublime to its very opposite, a feeling of sublime grandeur.
Suffice it here to say that in the state Wordsworth talks about,
subject and object are fused, melt into each other in such a way
that it makes little sense to differentiate between external object
and internal experience because both coincide, and the real
experience of the sublime constitutes the sublime.
But this—and this is the crucial point here—makes the
experience of the sublime paradigmatic of an idealist epistemology because it shows—although it is "merely" a borderline
experience—that all we perceive and know is only given as a
" Wordsworth, Prose, 2:349-60; here 357.
Wordsworth, Prose, 2:355.
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presence in our consciousness, as a state of our own mind. Was
that Shelley's position at the time? Without any doubt. The
brilliant closing lines of "Mont Blanc" say nothing but that it
is human consciousness that projects the world according to its
categories, actively structures the flow of sense impressions, and,
most important of all, transcends the world thus experienced by
giving it human significance.^^
But there is also external evidence, in Shelley's essay On Life
(formerly dated 1812 to 1814, then 1815, now December 1819),
that has to be adduced because it has often been cited to present
"Mont Blanc" (with which it is often coupled) and Shelley as
being idealist through and through. It is true that in On Life
Shelley writes "nothing exists but as it is perceived" and he
distances himself from his youthful materialism;
"This
materialism is a seducing system to young and superficial minds.
It allows its disciples to talk, and dispenses them from
thinking."^ When he continues, "Each is at once the centre and
the circumference; the point to which all things are referred,
and the line in which all things are contained," this reads like
a prose paraphrase of "Mont Blanc'"s last three lines. In his
epistemological idealism he cancels, as was to be expected, the
demarcation line between object and idea when he reiterates,
"Nothing exists but as it is perceived," and then continues, "The
difference is merely nominal between those two classes of
thought, which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas
and of external objects."^^ And in an ultimate intensification he
seems for a moment to become an absolute idealist, when he
says:

Already the "-witch of Poesy" passage, here only mentioned in passing, in which
the finding of the right image for the ravine of the Arve is greeted with an
emphatic "Thou art there!," can be understood as an instance of philosophical
ideaUsm.
" Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 476.
Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 477.
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Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of
distinct individual minds, similar to that which is
employed in now questioning its own nature, is likewise
found to be a delusion. The words I, you, they, are not
signs of any actual difference subsisting between the
assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely
marks employed to denote the different modifications of
the one mind....I am but a portion of it.^'*
What a field day for those who would like to pocket Shelley as
an unadulterated idealist! Is it possible to imagine a more
definite statement of one's philosophical idealism? But doesn't
that mean that the thesis here presented of Shelley as an
ontological materialist is obsolete? Not at all. For On Life is
not yet at an end, and just as Shelley puts an idealistic
epistemology on top of his materialist ontology at the very end
of "Mont Blanc," he bases, at the end of On Life, his idealism
on a full-grown materialism. Essay and poem are inverse twin
texts:
that the basis of all things cannot be, as the popular
philosophy alleges, mind, is sufficiently evident. Mind, as
far as we have any experience of its properties, and
beyond this experience how vain is argument, cannot
create, it can only perceive. It is said also to be the
Cause? [sic]...[But] [i]t is infinitely improbable that the
cause of mind, that is, of existence, is similar to mind.^®
That is the last sentence of On Life. Or rather, it was, until
Donald Reiman and Sharon Powers in their edition of the essay
introduced the following, which had formerly been taken to be
a part of Shelley's Speculations on Metaphysics—it reads: "It is
said that mind produces motion and it might as well have been
Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 477-8.
Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 478.
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said that motion produces mind." But this only underlines the
message because it reminds us of d'Holbach's witty remark,
aimed at Descartes, in the Systeme de la Nature (which Shelley
knew) that rather than say there is something separate from
matter that can think, it would have been more consistent to
conclude that matter can think. A cutting application of
Ockham's razor. Mind is highly organized matter in motion
—Shelley continued to believe this, as can be seen from another
essay of his. On a Future State.
Shelley's universe is decidedly a material one, which does not
exist for man but confronts him indifferently. This realization
overwhelms him and would leave him helpless if it were not for
the insight that such knowledge and such self-knowledge is
possible only in his mind, this new quality of the universe, and
that there alone the world exists as a meaningful one. In "Mont
Blanc"—and this will go on for years—Shelley is an ontological
materialist and an epistemological idealist at the same time.
Isn't that philosophically dubious.' Maybe less so than it
seems at first sight, and a second look will be taken in the
concluding section. But we can say already that Shelley
was—whatever he thought about himself and in spite of his
stupendous reading and never-waning interest—no systematical
philosopher and that "Mont Blanc," after all, is a poem. As a
poet, it was enough for him to have reconciled (or aufgehohen)
the philosophical contradictions of his position in a genuinely
aesthetic category: the sublime.
And that he really saw them reconciled is borne out by a
simple, unassuming little word at the beginning of the third line
from the end of "Mont Blanc," a word whose placement is
evidence of Shelley's incredible poetic genius. It is the word
"and"—which here, quite unlike the expected "but," signals the
poetic Aufhehung of a philosophical antinomy. It is, by the
way, the same "and" that we find in the last sentence of On
Life. Shelley's materialism and his idealism are reconciled, their
opposition is transcended, in the aesthetic concept and in the
experience of the sublime, which he uses as a poetically
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dramatized bridge, or rather poetically dramatized hinge,
between two fundamentally opposed conceptions of the mindworld relationship. Here in Shelley the sublime is a phenome
non of dialectical turnover and we accept the proffered
reconciliation of the seemingly incompatible simply on account
of the sheer force and impetus of the dramatic reversal staged
in the last three lines of "Mont Blanc." Apparently, there are no
precursors for this in English poetry, nor, for that matter, in
English philosophy—but there is one in "continental"
philosophy, a man whose radical re-definition of the sublime
was only part of his greater, more encompassing enterprise to
transcend and overcome the sterile opposition of materialism vs.
idealism in what is now commonly called critical idealism:
Shelley's one precursor, by some sixteen years, in the strikingly
original handling of the sublime is, of course, Immanuel Kant.

Any "evolutionary" account of the changes in the discourse of
the sublime in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centu
ries—that is, avant et apres la lettre—lays itself open to the
chaise of a teleological reading of the evidence, especially so. if
the sketch culminates in Kant, as for example in Monk's now
much detracted classic, which states right at the beginning that
"it may be said that eighteenth-century aesthetic has as its
unconscious goal the Critique of Judgment, the book in which
it was to be refined and re-interpreted."^^
But the chaise is unfair and out of turn, since the prepara
tion, for heuristic purposes, of a line of development in the
history of an idea (or a discourse) in no way—it should be trite
to say so—presupposes, let alone asserts, a real teleology, and it
is exactly this kind of preparation that is indispensable for any
appreciation of Kant's achievement.
Monk, 6.
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In Thomas Burnet's The Sacred Theory of the Earth (Latin
1681; English 1684-90) we can already find the unmistakable
signs of a deep ambivalence about the experience of the
sublime. For Burnet, high mountains are a disgrace, they
disfigure the face of the earth and can only be explained as the
ruined remnants of the antediluvian world that was destroyed
by the great flood. Through this interpretation Burnet reads
high mountains as testimonies to man's sinfulness and prepares
the ground for an orthodox Christian resolution of his deeply
ambivalent attitude, "combining violent disparagement of the
ugliest objects in nature with an almost lyrical rhapsody on the
exalted emotions he had experienced among the Alps."^ The
religiously based resolution of his dread of and fascination with
high mountains is that they are read allegorically, as finite
representations of the infinite: "whatsoever hath but the shadow
and the appearance of INFINITE, as all things have that are too
big for our comprehension, they fill and overbear the mind
with their Excess, and cast it into a pleasing kind of stupor and
admiration."^®
So as early as in Burnet we can see that the sublime is a twophase phenomenon: a strong initial uneasiness or anxiety is
transfigured, by religious reasoning, into a reassuring calm. The
sublime is the unity of this initial distress and its consecutive
rational dissolution—a relaxation that is attributed to the insight
into the emblems of God's presence in the universe.
This handling of the experience sets the dominant tone for
the following century. "Delightful Horror," "terrible Joy"
—these coinings by John Dennis ("Sir Tremendous Longinus")—bespeak the same deep ambivalence we find recorded in
Burnet, and as with him so in Dennis the ambivalence is finally
resolved through reference to a transcendental signifier whose
ubiquitous presence is confirmed, or so it seems, by the awful
Nicolson, vii.
Quoted in Ernest Lee Tuveson, "Space, Deity and the 'Natural Sublime,"
Modem Language Quarterly 12 (1951): 20-38; here 34.
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scenery. The experience of the sublime in nature is read and
presented as a natural theodicy.
In his Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination (originally in
Spectator Nos. 409, 411-21) Joseph Addison follows the same
line of reasoning when he writes on the pleasures that arise
"from the sight of what is Great"^'—but with a significant
difference: He is the first to spell out, at least in one passage,^"
that when we deal with "that which is great beyond all
comparison" (Kant), it is "the understanding" or "Reason" that
comes to the aid of the baffled imagination^^ and helps to
integrate that which our limited and defective imagination could
not grasp.Kant will take the cue.
But it is Edmund Burke, the first to actually use the term
"sublime" as an aesthetic concept, who also makes the decisive
step toward a Verdiesseitigung of the idea, toward the cutting of
its transcendental ropes. In his Philosophical Enquiry into the
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), the
beautiful and the sublime are equivalent categories—equivalent
but opposed and asymmetrical, for whereas the beautiful causes
pleasure as it were directly, the sublime evokes a more
complicated, by now familiar, two-phase reaction in the
beholder: its final result is the delight or relief we feel when
^ The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), vol. 3, 540.
Spectator, 567.
Addison's use of "understanding" and "Reason" is, of course, not identical with
Kant's.
Ironically, for Addison it is the defective and limited faculty of our imagination
that God makes the prime tool in exercising his power over us: "In short, he can
so exquisitely ravish or torture the Soul through this single Faculty, as might
suffice to make up the whole Heaven or Hell of any finite Being" (Spectator,
579-80). Addison refrains from asking the heretical question what would happen
if we applied the reflexive, distancing power of reason to put our imaginative
horrors in perspeaive. This reticence about a glaring inconsistency and a
theological skandalon—i.e. that God uses an inferior and potentially delusive
faculty to impress us—is the price Addison has to pay for the rehgious foundation
of his aesthetics of the not-beautiful. For a more detailed discussion see Christoph
Bode, And what were thou...? Essay iiber Shelley und das Erhabene (Essen: Blaue
Eule, 1992), 32-8.
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the initial pain, danger, or terror is removed or realized to be
unfounded. Again, there is a dialectical turnover: Delight—as
opposed to pleasure—occurs when we realize that the threat is
not real:
"the sublime is an idea belonging to selfpreservation.""
Moreover, Burke translates the sublime into physiology.
Our feelings can be explained as changes in our nervous and
vascular systems. "Love" acts as vasodilation, or rather,
vasodilation results in what we call "love." In this physiological
framework, the beautiful is associated with relaxation and the
sublime with tension. But how could tension by itself be
delightful.^ For reasons of symmetry Burke skips over this
conspicuous inconsistency, knowing that delight is (as he was
earlier ready to admit) of course due to the relaxation after the
tension. The sublime is basically a heterogeneous feeling, a
compound, a two-stroke.
And it is, in Burke, decidedly a bodily phenomenon. The
alternation between tension and relaxation is consequently
compared to physical exercises:
Now, as due exercise is essential to the coarse muscular
parts of the constitution, and that without this rousing
they would become languid, and diseased, the very same
rule holds with regard to those finer parts we have
mentioned; to have them in proper order, they must be
shaken and worked to a proper degree.
Given this decidedly physical view of the sublime, as a laxation
of a blockage, it is easy to see why A. W. Schlegel jokingly
described Burke's sublime as a kind of laxative, "eine Art
vornehmer Pui^anz."" In spite of passages Burke inserted only
Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful, ed. Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 79.
Burke, Enquiry, 123.
" See Carsten Zelle, "Angenehmes Grauen": Literaturhistorische Beitrdgezur Asthetik
des Schrecklichen im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), 194.
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later, God has no systematic place in his aesthetics. In Burke,
for the first time, the discourse of the sublime has found an
entirely secular language.
Kant's famous discussion of the sublime in §§23-29 of The
Critique of Judgment begins with some similarities and
distinctions of the beautiful and the sublime. When Kant says
that the sublime—contrary to the beautiful which produces
direct Wohlgefallen (delight)—is attended by "a pleasure that
only arises indirectly, being brought about by the feeling of a
momentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a
discharge all the more powerful,"^^ Burke's influence is palpable.
But the main difference, according to Kant, between the two
phenomena is that
that which...excites the feeling of the sublime, may
appear, indeed, in point of form to contravene the ends
of our power of judgment, to be ill-adapted to our
faculties of presentation, and to be, as it were, an outrage
on the imagination, and yet it is judged all the more
sublime on that account. ifOJ 91)
The sublime in objects of nature has no finality in form
"making the object appear, as it were, preadapted to our power
of judgment" {CJ 91). From which it follows—and here Kant
for the first time formulates his revolutionary turnthat we express ourselves on the whole inaccurately if we
term any Object of Nature sublime....For how can that
which is apprehended as inherently contra-final be noted
with an expression of approval.^ All that we can say is
that the object lends itself to the presentation of a
sublimity discoverable in the mind. For the sublime, in
the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any
sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason.
Kant, 91.
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which, although no adequate presentation of them is
possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that
very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous
presentation. (CJ 91-92.
This is the core of Kant's theory of the sublime, presented in
the very first paragraph of his deliberation, to be elaborated in
the following ones. The sublime resides in the becoming aware
of an idea of reason, to which we are provoked by the
experience of the ultimate inadequacy of our sensuous faculties
and the imagination. It is the failure of these powers that
directs us to the instance that can record the failure: reason. It
is not, Kant maintains in provocative opposition to the
established discourse on the sublime, the objects themselves that
are sublime:
Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be called
sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored
one's mind in advance with a rich stock of ideas, if such
an intuition is to raise it to the pitch of a feeling which is
itself sublime—sublime because the mind has been incited
to abandon sensibility, and employ itself upon ideas
involving higher finality. {CJ 92)
Sublimity resides in us as beings of reason.
This becomes even clearer in §24 where Kant explains the
necessity of differentiating between the "mathematically
sublime" that we encounter when we are confronted with "what
is beyond all comparison great" {CJ 94), on the one hand, and the
"dynamically sublime"—"nature as might"—on the other. In the
former it is again our insight into the inadequacy of any
standard of our senses or the imagination that points to a
superior faculty—"The sublime is that, the mere capacity of
thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every
standard of sense" {CJ 98)—and beyond that to our destination
or vocation {Bestimmun^ as beings whose proprium lies beyond
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the sensuous. The classical formulation by which Kant stands
the theory of the sublime on its feet follows in §27:
The feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea that is a
law for us, is RESPECT. Now the idea of the comprehen
sion of any phenomenon whatever, that may be given us,
in a whole of intuition, is an idea imposed upon us by a
law of reason, which recognizes no definite, universally
valid and unchangeable measure except the absolute
whole. But our imagination, even when taxing itself to
the uttermost on the score of this required comprehen
sion of a given object in a whole of intuition, (and so
with a view of the presentation of the idea of reason,)
betrays its limits and its inadequacy, but still, at the same
time, its proper vocation of making itself adequate to the
same idea as a law. Therefore the feeling of the sublime in
nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute
to an Object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution
of the respect for the Object in place of one for the idea of
humanity in our own self—the Subject) [this emphasis
added]; and this renders, as it were, intuitable the
supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side
over the greatest faculty of sensibility. {CJ 105-6)
The experience of thesublime is a "displeasure'Vpleasure"—mix
that highlights "the supersensible side of our being" {CJ 106) as
it were by detour, through an exposition of the limitations of
our sensuous and imaginative faculties.
After this, Kant needs far less room to explain the corre
sponding experience of the dynamically sublime (§28). Here
the feeling of sublimity sets in once we realize that although as
physical beings we should be entirely impotent and helpless if
directly exposed to "nature as might," there is yet something in
us that allows us to see us as apart from the physical world, to
see that in us the idea of humanity cannot be violated if
something inessential is taken from us:
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Now in just the same way the irresistability of nature
forces upon us the recognition of our physical helpless
ness as beings of nature, but at the same time reveals a
faculty of estimating ourselves as independent of nature,
and discovers a pre-eminence above nature that is the
foundation of a self-preservation of quite another kind
from that which may be assailed and brought into danger
by external nature. This saves humanity in our own
person from humiliation, even though as mortal men we
have to submit to external violence....Therefore nature is
here called sublime merely because it raises the imagina
tion to a presentation of those cases in which the mind
can make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of
the sphere of its own being, even above nature [in
German: "in welchen das Gemiit die eigene Erhabenheit
seiner Bestimmung, selbst iiber die Natur, sich fiihlbar
machen kann"]. {CJ 111)
Summing up, Kant says at the end of §29 that "Sublimity,
therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but
only in our own mind, in so far as we may become conscious
of our superiority over nature within, and thus also over nature
without us (as exerting an influence upon us)" {CJ 114).
According to Kant, the sublime is the dialectical self-recognition
of man as a rational being in confrontation with the otherwise
humanely incommensurable. It is an act of appropriation, even
subjugation of the other, an act in which impotence is
transformed into omnipotence.^^ Kant's sublime is the Endsieg
of the Enlightenment. When he introduces, at the end of §29,
the idea of God, he makes it clear that we owe this Being
respect not so much for "the mere display of its might in
nature" as for "the faculty which is planted in us of estimating
See Hartmut Bohme and Gemot Bohme, Das Andere der Vemunft: 2ur
Entwicklung von Rationalitdtsstrukturen am Beispiel Kants (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1983).
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that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted
above it" {CJ 114). God receives an honorable mention. He is
of no systematic importance to Kant's theory of the sublime.
In Kant, the sublime is re-defined as a moment of self-recogni
tion of consciousness in opposition to the absolutely great and
immeasurably powerful, the moment when we say, defiantly
claiming our status as beings who invest an ostentatiously
indifferent universe with meaning—and be it the meaning of
recognized futility—"And what were thou, and earth, and stars,
and sea / If to the human mind's imaginings / Silence and
solitude were vacancy.'"
If space permitted it could be shown that Kant's critical
idealism in a philosophical way successfully attempts the same
reconciliation of materialism and idealism that Shelley strove to
achieve poetically; that the traces of materialism and idealism
in the fields of ontology and epistemology respectively are
distributed equally in Shelley and Kant; that, most important
of all, it is no contradiction that Shelley sees the imagination as
the highest human faculty, whereas Kant uses the deficiency of
that faculty to inaugurate reason as the prime mover. Shelley's
term "imagination" virtually encompasses the same realm and
serves the same function that Kant assigns to "indetermined
ideas of reason" (^unbestimmte Vemunftideerf), the difference is
merely one of words.
A re-reading of Shelley's "Mont Blanc" against the back
ground of Kant's Critique of Judgment would show that the
congruence of the two concepts of the sublime is almost
uncanny: Mont Blanc is an instance of the mathematically
sublime because the immensity of the massif cannot be
grasped—"the very spirit fails" the moment "Far, far above,
piercing the infinite sky, / Mont Blanc appears,—still, snowy,
and serene—." As mountain pierces sky, two infinities meet, and
to spatial infinity Shelley adds temporal with "all seems eternal
now" (75) and "the everlasting universe of things" (1). The
For an extended discussion of this see Bode, "And what were thou...?," 69-93.
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dynamically sublime is introduced as Shelley ingeniously pans
down the mountainside, offering its "flood of ruin"—a material
threat, nature as might: "The race / of man, flies far in dread"
etc. (llZfl), until the very end when the omnipotence of an
indifferent Power is first exalted to an extreme—
The secret strength of things
Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome
Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee! (139-41)—
and then dialectically tipped over into an affirmation of the
sublimity of the human mind:
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea.
If to the human mind's imaginings
Silence and solitude were vacancy? (142-4)
One last time the whole catalogue of the natural sublime is
invoked (mountains, sky, and oceans), only to be repudiated-.
Shelley insists, as Kant did, that contrary to the common
subreption ("substitution of a respect for the Object in place of
one for the idea of humanity in our own self—the Subject"), the
sublime resides in the human mind {Gemiii) as "respect for our
own vocation."
Strictly speaking, of course, Kant's radical re-definition of the
sublime—its Verdiesseitigung—is the exact opposite of a
Copernican revolution, since it does not decenter the subject
but, quite the contrary, installs it at the center of an experience
that was formerly believed to prove the supremacy of
something extraneous to the human mind. It should therefore
be obvious that the assertion, in Shelley's "Mont Blanc," of an
indifferent or even hostile universe and the simultaneous
assertion of the sublimity of "the human mind's imaginings" is
by no means a mere coincidence but a structural necessity. It
marks the secularization and subjectivization of a concept that
will, far later, be defined as linguistic incommensurability.
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Especially since there is no evidence for a direct influence of
Kant on Shelley, so that we are invited to regard both, the
one's philosophy and the other's poetry, as independent
manifestations of the same shift of paradigm, it follows, I
believe, that each could be used with profit to shed some
illuminative light on the other. Considering the almost
provocative neglect and ignorance of Kant in recent studies of
Romanticism,^' one can only deplore the careless forfeit of that
chance. Kant these days, it seems, remains to be re-discovered
for the study of Romanticism.
It hardly matters whether right at the beginning of a study on the sublime in
English poetry and painting between 1770 and 1850 the author declares that "I am
going to neglect almost totally the philosophical and psychological contributions
of the Germans" 0ames B. Twitchell, Romantic Horizons: Aspects of the Sublime
in English Poetry and Painting, 1770-1830[Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1983], x), or whether in another study Kant is mentioned but in such a way that
one has reason to doubt that the author is familiar with the philosopher at all
(Leighton, 17-18). The way was led, I believe, by Theodore Wood, who,
obviously acquainted with Kant only through an essay by Iris Murdoch, ventures
to say: "This theorizing by Kant is all very well when taken as a part of a
systematic whole, but I do not think it even necessary to point out that it tells us
very little that we really want to know about esthetics" (43).

